Two Years after Paris; Where do we Stand on Climate?

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The Bonn climate conference wound up in the wee hours of Saturday 18th November, and delegates headed home.  What was accomplished there?  More important: What has the global community accomplished on climate in the two years that have elapsed since the Paris Agreement was finalized in 2015?

Somehow this image talks to me about the impacts we are having on our planet.
Image
© DesignCurial

Bonn, chaired by Fiji, an island nation at some heightened risk compared to countries in Europe or North America, was never expected to accomplish a great deal in the battle against climate change.  Its main goal was to begin the process of negotiating the rules and procedures that would translate the Paris Agreement into actions against climate change.  This was accomplished although some difficult issues were left till 2018.

We are Lagging Behind the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement centers on the individual, but publicly announced, national goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs).  These INDCs (Intended Nationally Determined Contributions) are specific voluntary commitments by each national government to reduce GHG emissions by specified amounts in a specified time.  In UN-speak, countries are invited to include, when reporting their INDCs, “quantifiable information on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base year), time frames and/or periods for implementation, scope and coverage, planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches including those for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, as appropriate, removals, and how [that nation] considers that its intended nationally determined contribution is fair and ambitious, in light of its national circumstances”.  As lots of people pointed out to the Naked Emperor, when he announced that the USA would leave the agreement, INDCs are very definitely completely voluntary promises made by independent national governments!

The Paris Agreement was intended to make individual national actions transparent and explicit, and to encourage fulfilling, and strengthening, such commitments by means of that openness.  It remains to be seen whether an economic transition of the scope required to reach the “much less than 2oC” Paris goal will be possible through a multinational agreement to “all please try very hard”, with lots of gold ribbons, bronze plaques, and praiseful oratory directed to those nations doing their very best, and a few catcalls, ‘fossil of the year’ awards, and other opprobrium directed to those who underperform.  The framers either had considerable faith in the ability of nations to act morally, and for the common good, or, more likely, they were in a very tough spot with no other way to move the process forward.  Heartfelt, public encouragement seemed (and still seems) better than doing nothing at all.

As nations signed on, each was expected to provide a statement of its INDC.  The Paris Agreement formally came into force when 75% of signatory nations ratified.  This occurred in time for COP22, the UN climate meeting held in Marrakech, 15-18 November 2016.  COP23, in Bonn, advances the process a few steps further.  There will be a formal ‘taking stock’ at COP24 late in 2018, at which time the progress made as well as the goals announced by each nation will be examined.  It is expected that at least some nations will ramp up their commitments at this time.  If this does not happen, we will know we have a very serious problem on our hands.  A further ‘taking stock’ will take place in 2020, and thereafter, new commitments, performance and goals will be monitored on a 5-year schedule.

As everybody who has been following this knows, the pooled INDCs currently in place are woefully insufficient to achieve the <2oC goal, let alone the ambitious <1.5oC target.  The New York Times recently provided a simple animation to show this.  And PBL, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, provides a complete set of up-to-date, country-specific plots.

For example, here is a global plot, showing total GHG emissions (in Gigatonnes of CO2 equivalents) up to 2014, then projected to 2030 under various assumptions.  The “current policies” line (gray with green range) is scarcely below the two versions of “business as usual”, and definitely above the pledges made.  All of these are far, far away from the trajectories needed for 2oC or 1.5oC Paris goals.

Plot of total global emissions as Mt CO2equivalents, 1990 to 2030.  Shown are projections under two business-as-usual scenarios, under a scenario including implementation of all currently announced national emissions policies, and as required under scenarios that would achieve the 2oC and the 1.5oC targets.  Also shown are the expected 2020, 2025 and 2030 global emissions assuming full implementation of all nationally announced emissions policies.  Image © PBL.

Just for fun, the following are individual country plots for Canada, the USA, the European Union, and China.  While China’s emissions are still rising, its trajectory is on track with its pledged reductions in rate of increase, and it will overshoot (i.e. achieve goal earlier than planned) its 2020 pledge.  The EU is also on track for its 2020 commitment, but will not reach its 2030 goal with present policies.  The USA and Canada have both got a lot of work to do.  And remember, all of these 2020 and 2030 goals are woefully inadequate to reach the long-term <2oC goal of the Agreement.

 Plots of total national emissions, as Mt CO2 equivalents, for Canada, the USA, the European Union, and China.  Projections are for business-as-usual, and for full implementation of current INDCs.  The 2020, 2025 (USA only), and 2030 announced national targets are also shown.
Images
© PBL.

 

Achievements in Bonn

So, what was achieved in Bonn?  Well, the good news is that the retreat of the USA has not led to other countries slacking off further.  If anything, Trump’s idiotic denialism and intransigently xenophobic nationalism has been good for the climate process.  Apart from a single US-mounted public event extolling the value of coal as an energy source, the members of the official US delegation worked constructively with other nations to improve the Paris Agreement, and there was an abundant presence by governmental representatives of States reporting that they were still committed to Paris, even if the White House was not.

When the US-mounted a session on the virtues of coal, including words from the CEO of Peabody Coal (a noted funder of denialism), it was drowned out by singing protestors for 10 minutes, and then continued in a half-empty room. Photo © Lucas Schultze/Getty Images.

Michael Bloomberg likened this promotion of coal at a climate event as akin to promoting cigarettes at a cancer conference.  But I guess now the loyal base can be told that the President tried to explain the alternative facts on coal, but the rest of the world would not listen because they are so unfair to the bigly great USA.  Some of them will believe him.

Closer to the agenda, there was some quiet progress made on a number of issues.  Negotiators reported they had made some real progress on refining the rules that will make it possible to verify whether nations are living up to their commitments on Paris, however the development of that rule book is not expected until (and will have to be in place for) next year’s COP24 meeting in Poland.  Some progress was made in encouraging China, India and other developing countries to become more transparent about how they are reducing emissions growth, but there was little progress in defining the amounts of international aid to be provided by developed countries.  Fiji and other island nations were disappointed that there was little willingness shown for sweeping steps to compensate weak nations already suffering the brunt of climate impacts.  (If the attitudes that have led the USA to be so very slow at supporting Puerto Rico in its time of need are widespread among nations, I fear the poor and weak among nations will get lots of nice words and a bit of charity, but not much else.)

There was wide recognition at Bonn of just how much further countries must go to achieve the Paris goals, but there were no surprise announcements.  Nations were biding their time till next year, while coming to grips with how much the global political landscape has changed since the heady days of Paris.  And Canada got mentioned from time to time, for doing constructive things, like helping lead in the push for countries to sign on to eliminate use of coal by 2030.

Packed venue for the Powering Past Coal event spearheaded by Canada and the UK with the Marshall Islands (somewhat more popular event than the other coal event on the agenda at COP23).  Image © UNClimateChange/Flickr

 

Meanwhile back in the real world?  An open letter.

So, what is happening on the climate front elsewhere in the world?  I’ll begin with the open letter published by some 15,000 scientists, including me, and timed to hit the media during the Bonn meeting.  I don’t usually sign open letters that are sent to me over the web, but this one seemed worthwhile.  A group of eight biologists, chiefly tropical forest specialists, at universities in the USA, Australia, Brazil, Bangladesh, and Nigeria conceived this project, arranged for publication as an open access article in BioScience, a respected journal, and then used the web to invite other scientists to sign on.  Publication was timed for Bonn.  The lead author is Bill Ripple of Oregon state University.  The article is titled: World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity: A Second Notice.  It appears 25 years after the Union of Concerned Scientists mounted a similar effort to coincide with the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (the conference at which, among many other things, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, parent of the Paris Agreement) was established).

The 1992 warning identified a number of disturbing trends caused by human activities.  They expressed concern about current, impending, or potential damage on planet Earth involving ozone depletion, freshwater availability, marine life depletion, ocean dead zones, forest loss, biodiversity destruction, climate change, and continued human population growth.  In their view, if continued, the trends observed would prove more than the biosphere could bear, with grave consequences for mankind.  Their article sparked the development of thinking about what are now called the 9 planetary boundaries.  I’ve commented on them in previous entries here.

Figure 1 from the World Scientists’ Warning, depicting nine trends that refer to the eight concerns expressed 25 years previously (CO2 emissions and temperature both reference climate change).  Only the rate of emissions of ozone-depleting CFCs shows improvement.  Figure © W. Ripple et al.

What Ripple and colleagues have done is draw attention to these trends again, noting that mostly they have continued exactly the way they were trending 25 years ago.  Further, of the two which have changed direction, the catch of marine fisheries has fallen because our reduction of global marine biomass (90% since the 1940s) has reached the point that we can no longer catch the amount of fish that we used to – this is not a case of changed policy but of a trend reaching its endpoint – the emptying out of the oceans.  Of the nine trends, the only one showing improvement in the past 25 years is the rate of emissions of ozone-depleting CFCs.

Looking at these graphs, it is easy to despair, and that is probably not helpful.  It’s also possible to draw attention to the scales on the vertical axes and ask whether the downward trend in hectares of global forest, or that of freshwater resources per capita would look quite so alarming if the scale had been extended down to zero.  Still, even with these caveats, the lack of change in trends that were common knowledge and warned about a quarter century ago does cause me to wonder what it will take to get us to change our behavior in sensible ways.  The article was picked up by a number of media, so it had its 15 minutes of fame.  I just hope we do not have a third such message in 2042 with the trends still unchanged.  (Come to think of it, if they don’t change, we might not be writing such messages any more.  These are serious problems and we are not doing enough about them.)

So how are GHG emissions this year?

In the middle of all this, I came across a graph conveying a powerful message.  It is one thing to explain that one of the huge problems with our impacts on the planet is that we are causing changes that are very rapid compared to similar changes in the past, that the problem is as much one of rate as of extent of change.  It is another thing to show this effectively.

Change in CO2 concentration now and in the recent past.  Image © WMO

The graph appeared on the front page of the latest WMO Greenhouse Gas Bulletin.  It’s not exactly the Wall Street Journal, but it’s an 8-pager released annually by the World Meteorological Organization.  The image accompanied a report that CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere had continued to grow in 2017, and had reached levels not seen in the last 800,000 years.  (Interestingly, some media reports reported the level as higher than in the last 3 million years which is also approximately correct, but WMO was concentrating on time periods for which we have direct measurements of CO2 in air rather than indirect proxies.)

The more interesting thing about the graph, however, was that the rate of growth in 2017 – 3.3ppm CO2 increase during the year – was the fastest ever recorded since direct measurements began in 1958, although this was spurred on by a very strong el Niño.  And the really clever thing about the graph is that it pairs direct, high resolution measurements of CO2 concentration in air bubbles in ice deposited in the early Holocene, when very rapid warming was taking place, and direct measurements in the atmosphere today.  The two data sets have been selected to display about an 80ppm change in CO2 concentration, and then the horizontal axes have been expanded/compressed so that the change takes place over the same width of space on the page: two lines rising sharply upward to the right.   The two lines represent a change of about 80ppm in CO2 concentration, although the early Holocene line on the left shows a change from ~190ppm to 270ppm, while that on the right shows the recent change from 320ppm to 400+ppm.

So, the same amount of change in each graph.  But look at the time involved: ignoring the time prior to 17000 years ago, the early Holocene graph spans 7000 years before the 270ppm amount is reached.  By contrast, the same absolute change in CO2 concentration took place between 1960 and 2017 – 57 years.  Now see the narrow vertical line at 11500 years ago in the left-hand graph?  The one you barely noticed at first.  That’s 57 years also!  Now do we all appreciate what scientists mean when they say the rates at which we are adding CO2 to the atmosphere are unprecedented?  You bet we do!  Hell, I can scare myself just by looking at this figure.

And so, it is time to summarize.  The Bonn climate conference went off with few hitches, made reasonable progress, but there is still a very long way to go.  The US delegates behaved reasonably well, which is about as positive as you can get from the White House (also known as #HOTNE – home of the naked emperor).  Virtually every country has got to put its shoulder to the wheel more effectively than it has done – so I guess I had better continue prodding Canada to step up and really do our part.  A relatively large subset of scientists from around the world put out some disturbing information, trying to stress the point that we seem to have made little progress on the environmental crisis in the past 25 years – although we sure have written a lot and conferenced a lot trying to achieve change.  And finally, I found a wonderfully effective graph of real CO2 data that displays in a very convincing way how much more rapidly we are adding CO2 to the atmosphere than was the case in the early Holocene when the Pleistocene ice sheet was melting at its most rapid rate.

I wonder what winter of 2017/2018 is going to bring here?  I think I need to go find a reef or two.

This seems better than snow and ice to me.  Photo © Imago/OceanPhoto

Categories: Canada's environmental policies, Climate change, Coal, Politics | Comments Off on Two Years after Paris; Where do we Stand on Climate?

Hey, our world is a whole lot more complicated than we ecologists seem to believe.

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I’ve been thinking a fair bit about the difficult challenges we face if we are going to become that responsible humanity we would like to see emerge in the Anthropocene.  I’m talking about the challenges in steering the planet successfully into a good future, meaning one not too different from the Holocene in which human civilization was born and came of age.  Don’t know what I mean about steering the planet?  Guess you have not been reading this blog.  Or much else about the global environmental crisis that surrounds us.

Like the navigators on board Hokule’a sailing the world’s ocean, we must learn how to steer our planet towards a safe, Holocene-like future.  Never been done before.  Can we do it?  Photo © Bryson Hoe & Polynesian Voyaging Society.

In a nutshell, we humans have become a potent planetary force causing big changes on this planet.  Changes so big that most environmental scientists now recognize present-day times as the Anthropocene, a new geological age in which the major planetary changes are being caused by one species of life – li’l ol’ us.  The problem, of course, is we have been changing the world in bad ways – ways that make it a less wonderful environment for creatures like us to live in.  Indeed, we have triggered what could become the sixth great mass extinction on the planet – average extinction rates for vertebrates are now estimated to be between 100 and 1000 times higher than typical over the grand sweep of geological history.  The last great mass extinction took place at the end of the Cretaceous age, 65 million years ago, and took out the last of the dinosaurs among many other creatures.  We have no idea what will disappear in the 6th extinction, although most non-domesticated vertebrates are high on the list.  Only hubris tells us this does not matter to us.

It’s sort of a no-brainer that we must do better than we have been doing if we want the planet in future to resemble the planet we have come to know and love, the planet of the Holocene, a time in which we invented agriculture and built our great civilizations, a time in which climate was remarkably stable so we grew to depend upon the weather, the seasons, and the natural environments that largely clothed our world.   Doing better means using our considerable power to steer the planet towards a future that is good for us to live in.  If this smacks of self-interest, so be it.  It will also be a good world for many other species that share it with us.  But there are reasons to be concerned that we may not succeed in this great challenge: we may never develop a will to change our ways, we may leave it so late that the planet’s ecology will deteriorate so far that even the mighty we will not be able to turn it around, or we may simply underestimate the challenge of steering effectively.

As somebody once said, “Ecology is not rocket science; it’s a whole lot more complicated than rocket science”.  Steering the planet towards a good future is a supremely ecological task, and I don’t know if we can do it.

I’m not talking here about our difficulty in agreeing on the task at hand, although that is a major challenge that seems to become larger instead of smaller as the first year of the Trump administration plods along.  I wonder if future historians will introduce a new calendar in which AD refers to ‘After Donald’ – but I digress…

I’m not even talking about the technical complexity of the challenges we will face, or the political challenges as we are forced to decide on a global path of action that will necessarily not benefit every corner of the globe equally.  I’m thinking about our ability to recognize the complexity of the world around us, so that we may plan and act in ways that are sufficiently subtle to be effective.  In what follows, I’ll set out why I think our own physiology limits our ability to see the complexity around us.  I’ll then take our thinking about coral reef systems as an example, looking at three recent papers that show how much more complex reefs are than in the models we create of them.  I then suggest some ways we might do better.

How we see our world

The human is an incredible creature.  It views its world using five senses of which vision is primary, with hearing and touch perhaps next in line.  Each of these senses is served by a suite of more or less complex sensory detectors – light receptors for example – organized into complex sensory organs that act to convert external stimuli (light in this case) into the language of the nervous system.  Activated sensory receptors stimulate nearby sensory neurons chemically.  Sometimes the stimulation is positive causing the neuron to become more active physiologically, and sometimes it is negative, inhibiting the activity of that neuron.  Sensory neurons, in turn, chemically stimulate or inhibit other nearby neurons, and so it goes until a modified pattern of neuronal activity reaches the brain.  It does not stop there, but instead becomes even more complex as neuronal pathways within the brain become activated or quietened down both because of chemical stimulation among the neurons coming in from the sense organ, and because of influences on that activity due to action of other neurons carrying their own messages from other sense organs, or the internal environment of the organism.  Miraculously, by the time this complex modulation of the activity of neural cells within the brain reaches the visual cortex, it is decoded as information about the outside world.  If the individual is ‘paying attention’ to its visual sensors, it recreates an image of reality and become aware of the world outside.

Vision – it is a sophisticated image analysis process, not a bit like building an image from pixels.  Image © London Neuro Physio Ltd

This process is radically different from what goes on in the camera in a cell phone – while the visual cortex of the human brain is laid out as a map that approximates the visual field of view, there is nothing resembling an array of pixels, or any other kind of image.  Instead, there are neurons that respond to edges, neurons that respond to small dark objects that are moving, but not to ones that are still, neurons that respond to intersection of two edges, and so on. By the time visual information reaches the visual cortex, it has already been simplified, codified and analyzed in ways that emphasize those things or events in the visual field that, over evolutionary time, have proved important to our survival – our visual system highlights those things that are important to us.  Yet we see – somehow creating an internal impression of a complete visual field, and our auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile systems all operate in much the same way.  We don’t see perfectly, or accurately – that is, we don’t build a perfect replica of reality somewhere inside our heads.

In fact, our visual systems (or other sensory systems) do an enormous amount of filtering, compressing, and coding of the information that arrives at the visual cortex.  Our eyes have not evolved to present us with pretty pictures.  They, and the full network of neurons connecting them to the visual cortex, have evolved to detect movement, edges, color, and very simple shapes.  Out of these building blocks we somehow create sunsets.  But we do so by filling in gaps, by embroidering, and by glossing over the simplifications that have resulted as information travels from the eye to the brain.  And our conscious selves are totally unaware of all this processing.

It is possible, and plausible, to argue that our usual patterns of thought are a consequence of the way in which our neural system works.  We categorize, classifying stimuli into a small number of different types, such as the different colors of the rainbow, or crudely into just two types – lighter vs darker, larger vs smaller, moving to the left vs moving to the right and so on.  In classifying, we also simplify, emphasizing the features that distinguish one class of stimulus from another while minimizing or ignoring those that exist among members of the same class of stimulus.  For example, reality presents us with a continuous gradation of light frequencies across a rainbow, yet we persist in seeing bands of different color.  We are quick to detect movement, distinguishing moving from still objects, but quite poor at judging speed of movement.  This tendency to classify, categorize, contrast images extends also to conceptual thinking.

We find it easy to categorize similar, but not identical images as belonging to a single class of objects, or rabbits in this case.  We emphasize the differences among classes, but minimize (don’t see) those within classes.  Image © Planwallpaper

We all know what a rabbit is, but rabbits come in a great array of sizes, shapes and colors, and a rabbit facing you looks very different to one facing away.  Our concept of the species is a great example of our ability to cluster individual items into a single class that differs from other classes (other species).  We are remarkably good at throwing away information, so as to focus on what we choose to consider the important information – a rabbit is a mammal with a specific pattern of dentition, plus several other features that we use in classifying it in Order Lagomorpha.  Those features are quite similar to, but different from those of that other large group of species we call Rodentia.  There are a number of different species of rabbit, but they share long, floppy ears, and a hopping locomotion.  They also breed like, well, rabbits.

We also see what we expect to see, completing partial information to understand what we assume to be present.  See a fluffy white tail disappearing into the distance with a hopping movement, and we all report having seen a rabbit.  This ability to complete, or more generally to resolve, sensory information according to what we expect is why visual illusions are so captivating.  The illusion presents contradictory information according to what we expect to see, and we struggle when what we see does not seem to make sense.  Our ease in completing fragmentary information is considerable and mostly subconscious.  Marshall McLuhan said it well: “If I had not believed it, I never would have seen it”.

When people become scientists, they do not stop being humans.  Scientists use the same sensory systems as other people, and similar thought processes, when they collect data from the environment, or when they evaluate results of their observations or experiments they have run.  This remains true, even when the instruments they use for collecting those data are complex, sophisticated, and with great discriminatory power.  Part of the training as a scientist involves applying objective criteria for making the classificatory decisions we all make all the time.  There are many objective reasons why scientists agree on the specific features that make a rabbit a rabbit and not a squirrel, a kangaroo, or a praying mantis.  We could have used quite different criteria and classified rabbits differently.  I think our decisions re rabbits, framing them as a group with common evolutionary ancestry, have been logical; I admit we could have done things quite differently.  And this brings me finally back to environment and ecology.

We seduce ourselves to be content with too simple models

Ecology is a whole lot more complicated than rabbits.  To begin with, any ecological system is comprised of numerous individuals belonging to different species of life, each with specific requirements which it obtains from the environment, and each struggling to survive and reproduce.  These different individuals necessarily interact with each other as well as with the physical environment – most obviously there are the consumers and the consumed. But there are also those species which compete with each other for the things they need, and those species which cooperate with each other in order to obtain things they need (sometimes, but not necessarily the same things).

Reef-building corals (not all corals, because some live slowly in deep cold water and do not build reefs) compete with large fleshy algae and other organisms for space in the sunlight.  They sometimes shade each other out, and the shaded organism – coral or alga – dies.  But reef building corals also cooperate in an intricate intracellular relationship with single-celled algae which spend their lives within the coral’s tissues.  The corals cannot build reefs without the physiological boost they receive from their embedded cooperating algae, and the embedded algae, in turn, do better than they would if drifting freely in the water column, because some of the coral waste products are valuable nutrients for the algae.  Add in the fact that there are many different species of coral, and several different clones (effectively species) of symbiotic algae, as well as the fact that corals grow in a variety of environments from very shallow to deeper, from nearly nutrient-free to quite eutrophic waters, and from warm to very warm water, and it becomes clear that simply describing the relationship between corals and algae just got a lot more complicated.  Finally, add in the fact that there are lots of other creatures living on a coral reef that, in turn, interact in various ways with the corals and/or with the algae.  Suddenly we have a complex system with many interacting and changing parts.  Step back a bit, and the coral reef becomes just one of a number of ecosystems, each with its own complex assemblage of organisms and the nutrients and other resources they each need.

Under these circumstances, it would be naïve to believe that we are close to understanding how the biosphere operates, let alone how its operation will change as the climate changes.  We tend to complete our view of the world from fragmentary sensory information, and we tend to alternately magnify and ignore differences among species, among interactions, and among differing times and places as we build our conceptual models of how the world works.  Given these tendencies, the complexity of ecological systems absolutely demands a humble, precautionary approach as we build our understanding.  We are virtually guaranteed to be incorrect in our interpretations of some aspects, or simply to have completely ignored subtle but important processes.  Our enthusiasm for simple models encourages such errors, and can help lead us down some very unproductive paths.

I don’t deny that we can only advance our scientific understanding by developing simple models first, only adding to their complexity when they prove to be inadequate models of reality.  But I suggest that, too often, we become attached to our simple models, clinging to them long after it should be obvious to all that they are inadequate representations of reality.  And I suggest we do this partly because of our own sensory and analytical limitations.  We are too easily satisfied by overly simple models.  We need to examine them more rigorously than we usually do, and to work towards more complicated, but more realistic and reliable models than we usually do.

Coral reef decline and the interaction of corals and algae

Ecologists studying coral reefs know that these are particularly diverse systems.  One might expect we’d be particularly alert to the problem of too-simple models, and yet we do not appear to be so.  There are many coral reefs around the world that have lost a considerable proportion of the coverage of living coral they enjoyed as recently as the mid-20th century.  Reef ecologists refer to this broad pattern as reef decline or reef degradation.  Many such degraded reefs now support dense stands of foliose algae, and the presence of these algae makes it very difficult for new coral juveniles to survive and grow.  In many cases, the transition from a coral-dominated to an algal-dominated state was sudden, brought about by a catastrophic storm, bleaching event, or population explosion of crown-of-thorns starfish which prey upon corals.  A part of the complexity of reef systems is that not all storms, all starfish outbreaks, or even all bleaching events result in a profound, seemingly permanent, change in composition of the reef community.  Scientists refer to such abrupt transitions in ecosystem state as phase shifts, and recognize that changes to ecosystems are not always gradual, nor irreversible.  Sometimes reefs recover.

Reef ecologists prefer reefs with lots of living coral and few algae.  We spend time talking about the resilience of such systems.  Photo © Sea Monster

We explore what we call the resilience of ecological systems, and debate ways to restore algal-dominated reefs to their former coral-dominated state.  In pursuing greater understanding of these phase shifts, we have developed models.  Mostly, those models have contained just three interacting agents – the coral, the algae, and the algal predator, sometimes called ‘herbivore’ and sometimes ‘herbivorous fish’.  We have yet to adequately explain why some reefs that suffer massive die-off of corals and increases in foliose algae, get back to becoming coral-dominated systems after a decade or so, while others do not.  In other words, our understanding of reef resilience, how resilience is maintained or eroded, and how corals and algae share the space available on reefs has a long way to go.  Surely, given the global trends towards coral reef decline, building this understanding of resilience should be viewed as a critical need in reef science.  We might expect some clear evidence of progress in the sophistication of thinking on this topic, and yet simple three agent coral – algae – herbivore models continue to be used.  Why are we making so little progress?

I don’t have an answer to this problem, but I suspect it is now time to stop pretending we can characterize the complex interactions among corals, algae, and herbivores of various types in a simple, three-agent, model.  A casual survey of recent papers suggests reef scientists are well aware of this need for more sophistication, but continued references to the phase shift from coral- to algal-dominated state suggest that being aware of, does not yet mean we are adjusting our thinking towards a more nuanced, multifactorial view.

Multiple weak positive feedback loops

My evidence (if citation of three papers can be called that) comes from an off-the-cuff survey of papers in the last two issues of the journal Coral Reefs.  In April, Ingrid van de Leemput, Egbert van Nes and Martin Scheffer at Wageningen University, the Netherlands, and Terry Hughes at James Cook University, Australia, published a modeling study of the coral – algae – herbivore interaction to explore effects of multiple feedbacks on the coral – algae phase shift.  They begin by reviewing the nature of ecological phase shifts and point to the need for positive feedback loops if alternate stable states such as coral-dominated and algal-dominated reefs are to exist.  In a survey of earlier studies, they found arguments and evidence for about 20 different positive feedbacks that could be operating in the coral-algae relationship, and they point out that the roles of few of these have been investigated to any degree.  They suggest that multiple weak positive feedback loops could operate together and that feedback processes that, by themselves, would be too weak to set up the alternate states and sudden phase shift between them, could suffice to do this if operating in tandem.

Van de Leemput and colleagues then proceed to model such a situation:  Their model retained the simplicity of ‘coral’, ‘algae’ and ‘herbivore’ each of which grew in dutifully density-dependent ways because corals and algae were both limited by available space and the system had a fixed carrying capacity for herbivores.  But built into the model were three distinct types of positive feedback.  First, the algae experienced a reduced per capita rate of herbivory as they became more abundant (the herbivores became satiated).  Second, the algae had a greater crowding impact on survival and growth of coral recruits than that due simply to their preemption of space on the reef, so that coral reproduction was impeded more severely the more abundant algae became (direct physical or chemical interference with the recruits that reduced the recruits’ survival or growth could do this).  Third, the coral had positive effects on the abundance of the herbivore (perhaps because the corals provided shelter that enhanced herbivore survival).

The model was adjusted so that the magnitudes of each of these positive feedbacks were insufficient to lead to the condition of alternate stable states when acting alone.  Fishing pressure was varied as a way of modifying herbivore numbers, and, when only one of the three positive feedback mechanisms was operating, the change in fishing pressure always led to a gradual shift from coral to algae as fishing pressure grew.  When all three feedback mechanisms were operating, the result was alternative stable states with the chaos of a sudden phase shift between them.

In each of these graphs, fishing pressure varies along the x-axis, and abundance of herbivores (blue line) tracks that, being highest at lowest fishing pressure.  In cases a through d there is a switch from coral-dominated to algal-dominated at a particular low-herbivory level; case A is the case with no positive feedbacks operating, and cases B, C, and D are cases in which each of the three weak positive feedbacks operate alone.  In contrast, case E, which includes all three weak positive feedback mechanisms, contains a region of hysteresis at mid-levels of fishing pressure and herbivory in which either a coral-dominated or algal-dominated state can exist, with sudden and unpredictable phase shift between them.  Figure 3 from Van de Leemput’s paper, © Coral Reefs.

Does this study explain the interaction between coral and algae on real reefs?  Certainly not, but it does illustrate a) that real reefs are much more complex in the nature of the interactions among coral, algae and herbivores then has usually been claimed (20 different possible positive feedback mechanisms), and 2) that as you add complexity to simple models you jump quickly to a world of more complex outcomes.  Imagine if they had added some additional realism by recognizing several different functional groups of corals, of algae and of herbivores (a point they make explicitly in their paper).

Fragility of coral reef systems

In July, also in Coral Reefs, Camilo Mora of University of Hawaii, Nicholas Graham of Lancaster University and Magnus Nyström of Stockholm University, reviewed the nature of global coral reef degradation, and argued for considering several ways in which coral assemblages were particularly sensitive to the effects of common anthropogenic stressors.  They referred to this sensitivity as the particular fragility of coral reefs.

Mora and colleagues begin by enumerating the many stressors to which we are subjecting coral reefs at present, including warming due to climate change, associated acidification, and multiple more local, but still extensive, effects of human use of coastal regions including overfishing, siltation, arrival of invasive species, and various forms of pollution.  They note that these stressors operate differently in different locations or at different times, that some are slow and progressive while others are intermittent and rapid in occurrence, and that they act on different spatial scales.  They then turn to the ways in which coral reefs are fragile.

Mora and colleagues argue that coral species in general have narrow tolerances to environmental conditions including temperature, pH, and many aspects of water quality.  These animals are being pushed beyond their tolerances by the multiple impacts of human activities, and the stresses are so great that the corals are simply unable to evolve the capacities needed to adapt.

They suggest that the metapopulations that predominately characterize coral reef organisms are susceptible to being degraded.  As individual populations are reduced or eliminated, the distances between populations grow and the connectivity due to larval dispersal among these populations falls.  Metapopulation dynamics falter, and the capacity to maintain or restore local populations is diminished.  Populations that were viable in the context of a functioning metapopulation become less able to maintain themselves.

The bumphead, Bolbometopon muricatum, is the world’s largest parrotfish (up to 130 cm long).  It is a grazing herbivore, and the major bioeroder on Indo-Pacific reefs; each adult chomps up some 5 tonnes of living/dead coral rock each per year.  Photo © University of California, Berkeley.

Mora and colleagues also argue that while coral reefs are notoriously diverse at the species level, those numerous species occur in very much fewer functional groups of species.  One might expect that when a stressor adversely affects one species in a diverse system, other members of its functional group would be available to continue serving its role in the community, thus leading to considerable resilience at the community level.  However, on coral reefs, where the allocation of species among functional groups has been examined, it has frequently been found that many important functional groups contain few members, or are dominated by one or two abundant species, with lots of other group members being extremely rare.  Under these circumstances, stressors that affect important species can radically alter the nature of the community, despite its nominally high diversity.  As one example, they point to the two Acropora species in the Caribbean that together played the primary role in producing the high rugosity so characteristic of and important to coral reef systems.  Both these species are now on the IUCN Red List, and far less abundant throughout the Caribbean than they were in the mid-20th century.  Their second example concerns Bolbometopon muricatum, a large parrotfish which provides a major component of surficial bioerosion on Indo-Pacific reefs.  It is easily extirpated by targeted fishing, and there is nothing that could take its place in fulfilling this role.  (This parrotfish argument hinges on the assumption that surficial bioerosion is necessary to provide stores of new bare rock for colonization by corals and other sedentary organisms – I am far from convinced.)  I’m also not convinced that coral reefs are unusual in the pattern of distribution of their many species among functional groups, compared to other diverse systems, or indeed that there are many species (keystone species) whose roles in their communities are so important that their removal leads to accelerated decline of the system, but I’m a bit of an outlier among ecologists on this topic, and this idea deserves some reflection.

(In the middle of this section of their paper, I discovered citations to two of my early papers, produced to support the view that ecological specialization partitions resources among species thereby favoring coexistence!  I seem to remember writing the exact opposite – but then the arrow of scientific progress is not usually straight, and this observation is a complete digression.  Sorry.)

The fourth type of fragility presented is the likelihood that degraded reef systems will be impeded from recovering because of feedback effects and extinction vortices – another way of talking about phase shifts and alternative stable states.  While I find some things to quibble about in this paper, it is well worth a read because they have pulled together so many examples of patterns and processes that add to the complexity of what is currently happening to reefs.  After reading it, most reef scientists will find it difficult to look at a three-agent, coral-algae-herbivore model, with maybe a couple of positive feedback loops thrown in, as anything more than a stick figure sketch, pretty far removed from what is happening on real coral reefs.  After all, how likely is it that variations in intensity of herbivory are the sole, or even the major, driving force leading to the replacement of corals by algae on reefs around the world?

Complexity revealed in a tiny field experiment

My final discovery was published in August in Coral Reefs, by Michael A. Gil, formerly at University of Florida, Gainesville, and now at U.C. Davis, and four colleagues associated with CRIOBE, that wonderful French marine research station in Moorea, French Polynesia, where the work was done.  This paper, part, I presume, of Gil’s PhD dissertation, was a classic manipulative field experiment, of a type that used to be somewhat more common on coral reefs than today.  It was small-scale, and lasted just 6 months, but represents well the general point I am trying to make (that we need to stop clinging to our simple models of reality on coral reefs).

Gil and colleagues forced themselves to look at just one aspect of the reef degradation story.  Namely, what happens to those reef organisms that remain after a reef has been degraded by Crown-of-thorns starfish or a storm.  Well, that’s what they claim, but actually they looked at effects on two species of corals and on turf and foliose algae in a classic three-factor, randomized block design, with two levels of each of the three factors applied, and nine replicates.  For non-scientists, that means they set out 72 experimental units including corals and substrata for algae and coral recruits to grow on, in a shallow back-reef region which had experienced the damaging effects of a Crown-of-thorns outbreak, followed by a cyclone, three years prior to the experiment.  They experimentally manipulated three potential stressors acting on their experimental units: sedimentation, nutrient enrichment, and overfishing, applying two levels (high and low) of each of these in all possible combinations to individual units.  Nine units received each of the eight different combinations of the three stressors.

Lest you think this was an immense undertaking, the experiment lasted just 6 months, and the experimental units were individual concrete building blocks to each of which were affixed one small branch of Acropora pulchra, a similar sized branch of Porites rus, and four 10 x 10 cm terra cotta tiles on which coral recruits, algae and other organisms would settle and grow.  The stressor manipulations were managed as follows: effect of overfishing was represented by enclosing some units within coarse-meshed wire cages to exclude large fish herbivores, while uncaged units, with more herbivory, represented a less-intensely fished environment.  Nutrients were either at the ambient levels for their study site, or an elevated level provided by slow release plant food in open tubes secured within the openings of the concrete block.  Sediment load was at ambient levels on some units, and elevated on others by manual delivery of measured amounts of sediments in daily pulses over two to three days each week of the experiment.  At the end of the experiment they reweighed each of the corals, recorded the percent of the colony still living, removed and weighed each of turf algae and macroalgae on two of the four tiles, and counted coral recruit skeletons remaining after removing all organic matter from one of the remaining tiles.  These measurements provided estimates of coral survivorship and growth, coral recruitment, and turf and macroalgal growth on each of their experimental units.  So, what did they find?

Diagram summarizing the various interactions Gil and colleagues found acting in their experiment.  Figure 1 from their paper © Coral Reefs.

As usually happens in ecology when several factors are included in the experiment, they found significant interactions among stressors in their effect, and quite different patterns of effect on the different components of the system they had measured.  Several of the results were unexpected and some were complex.  For example, A. pulcra proved highly susceptible to predation, and were grazed down to nothing on all the uncaged units while surviving far better when caged (having them mounted, enticingly, on top of concrete blocks clearly made them more vulnerable than they would be out on the reef!).  This did not happen to P. rus growing just inches away from the A. pulcra, however many specimens of P. rus showed partial mortality.  They found an interesting interaction between sedimentation and caging on this P. rus mortality: enhanced sedimentation improved coral survivorship in caged units, but reduced survivorship in open units.  Their interpretation of this result is that sedimentation influenced coral survivorship because of its impacts on algal growth.  Specifically, sedimentation reduced algal growth in the caged units (acting to counter the effects of reduced herbivory), but might also have reduced herbivory on uncaged units because the sediment-covered algae were somehow less palatable.  Thus, enhanced sedimentation has opposite effects on algae depending on level of herbivory occurring, and opposite but indirect effects on coral mortality.  When they examined growth of the still-living portions of corals, they found both coral species responded positively to nutrient enrichment.  Corals are not all alike, and these two species behaved differently in the context of this experiment.

Photos of one of Gil’s experimental units – a small nubbin of each of two coral species, and four terra cotta tiles all mounted on top of one concrete block.  Figure 2 from the paper © Coral Reefs.

Gil and colleagues also found complicated responses by the algae.  Foliose macroalgae were less abundant on tiles from cages receiving enhanced sedimentation, but were more abundant on tiles from uncaged units that also received extra sediments (the opposite effects used to explain the results for P. rus mortality).  Gil and colleagues draw attention to the difference between this result and a previously published study to suggest that the relationship between macroalgae and sedimentation is non-linear, another way of saying ‘more complex than we might assume’.  Turf algae showed a three-way interaction among nutrient levels, sediment levels and grazing pressure, brought about by pronounced enhancement of growth when nutrients were enriched in caged units, suppression of growth by enhanced sedimentation in caged units, and negligible effects of either of these factors on turf algal growth in open units subject to herbivory.

If anything, Gil’s study illustrates there is lots we do not yet understand about the interactions among turf algae, macroalgae, and two species of coral, or about how these interactions are modified by variation in sedimentation, nutrient load, or level of herbivory.  Many will dismiss this study as a short-term, incredibly artificial experiment, but it has teased out some unexpected complexity in how these organisms interact.

How do we advance our understanding of coral reefs?

I am sure I could have found many other papers, published recently, which reveal complexities in the ecological interactions in coral reef systems.  But it was easy to find these three, quickly, within two issues of one journal.  Each takes a very different approach, and each reveals important complexities.  Coral reef scientists read such papers regularly, yet while we absorb the messages being delivered, we do not seem to be applying those messages to build a more robust understanding of the complexities that exist.  Instead, we continue to rely upon simple models of singular processes, among minimal numbers of actors, as our way of trying to explain the dynamics of coral reef systems.  If we are to have any hope of applying our science in useful efforts to sustain or restore coral reefs, we need to become much more sophisticated in how we think about them.

I am not suggesting that reef scientists have been particularly backward or inept.  One could make similar arguments concerning the ecology of most systems on the planet.  Nor am I suggesting our understanding has not improved markedly over the last few decades.  But if the need to actively manage this planet is becoming as urgent as I believe it is, it is imperative that we attempt to build the robust science that might let us do that steering.  The question is, are we capable, collectively, of the much more complex thinking that will be needed?

There are some steps that could help.  First is to strengthen our critical thinking capacities so that we can subject new reports to a detailed analysis to find out what they are really contributing to our developing understanding.  This means actually reading far more publications, instead of just their abstracts, and citing them because they say something important, rather than because our colleagues are talking about them.  I remember a time early in my career when we marine ecologists would joke about the ‘West coast opening paragraph’ which could be distinguished from an “East coast’ analog, or a “European’ analog by the particular string of citations to standard west coast ecological work.  Writing the opening sentences to the introduction of an article back then was a bit like reciting a specified piece of scripture that alerted everyone to the fact that the author did indeed belong to that particular sect.  We have not progressed very far beyond that approach, and with the growing tide of new articles, in new journals, available instantly on the web, we are probably doing an even poorer job of critical reading than we were back then.

Second is to guide students to design research topics to tackle specific questions, questions that are ripe for being answered, and to use the answers to build a stronger body of science.  Research should be more than winning a grant, collecting some data, finding some interesting patterns, preparing several eye-catching figures, and generating some text to wrap it all together as the next in a long stream of articles, each one carefully promoted on-line as the newest, greatest, most amazing breakthrough in the field this century.  There are strong forces at work, including those that can impede progress in scientific careers, acting to force us away from thoughtful, careful, precisely designed studies to answer clear, focused questions.  Scientists must resist those forces; with breathless self-promotion increasingly the order of the day, resisting will be difficult.

A third step, I suggest, is to ensure that, once in a while, we reflect on our limitations as data-evaluating beasts.  We need to recognize, for a start, that even with the most sophisticated statistical and graphing programs now available, we still rely on our eyes and ears, and especially on our brains to interpret our data.  Seeing the things that are there, which we do not expect, is particularly difficult.  Indeed, there may be ways to train scientists to think in more than three dimensions, to imagine numbers bigger than 7, and to remember that the systems they study usually have more than 7 different agents interacting in more than 7 ways.  Recognizing the complexity of real systems even while trying to focus on a subset of agents and processes (in order to make any progress at all), is something we need to do continually yet is something easily forgotten.

If not forewarned, we mostly fail to see the gorilla in this classic experiment.  Watch it on You Tube.  If we can miss a gorilla, what else can we miss when evaluating research results?

A fourth step is to learn from other areas of science.  Ecologists need to force themselves to step outside the boundaries of their chosen research system to learn about techniques and discoveries of ecologists working on different questions in different systems.  Learning from scientists who are not ecologist is also worthwhile – and this may be the major benefit of doing research within truly interdisciplinary, as opposed to multi-investigator research groups.  As one example of learning from other ecologists, take herbivory.  Algae of different types are eaten by a range of herbivores who process them quite differently and therefore have marked preferences (and effectiveness as grazers) among the different types.  Macroalgae differ in palatability.  Macroalgae start out small, but given the chance can grow too large to be grazed by many of the herbivores.  Intertidal ecologists have studied to death how algae on rocky shores can escape herbivory; theirs is a story of considerable complexity, and rocky shore systems are far simpler than coral reefs.  Herbivory in terrestrial systems is similarly complex and well-studied.  Yet, all three of the papers I discussed here treat herbivory as if it is a unitary process operating with the simplicity of action of a good ride-on lawnmower.  I guarantee that herbivory on coral reefs is way more complex than that, and I am also certain the authors of all three papers know that.  It is time to apply that knowledge.

My final suggestion (and, no, I did not apply all these steps consistently or particularly successfully in my own career) is that we try to preserve humility.  Each of us is struggling to apply our science to build knowledge of how the world works.  Each of us is operating with a sensory and cognitive system evolved to permit us to find food, shelter and mates, while avoiding predators, diseases, and environmental catastrophes.  Our evolution has done a remarkable job, but we do not have some god-like gift for evaluating complex multi-component, multi-process systems and quickly deducing how they work.  As I said near the beginning, ecology is not rocket science; ecology is far more difficult than rocket science.  Our urgent challenge is to recognize the need and apply the effort to do much better than we have been doing.

This impressive photo of a red sea reef captures the sheer complexity of the ecosystem reef ecologists strive to understand.  Can we visualize the myriad pathways for exchange of energy, nutrients, or information, especially when we understand that many of the creatures will live here, with their neighbors, for a decade or more?  It is definitely more complicated than rocket science!  Photo © Lynn Wu was the 2015 overall winner of the In Water Photographer of the Year competition.

Categories: Climate change, Communicting science, coral reef science | Comments Off on Hey, our world is a whole lot more complicated than we ecologists seem to believe.

Transition is not easy – How we are doing on climate change.

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Do you ever wonder about how the global transition away from fossil fuels is going?  Or how climate change is progressing?  Lately, the media have been so stuffed with stories from the circus, that other kinds of news have been crowded out.  Even the circus has some acts relevant to the climate question, but let’s start at the beginning.

On June 8th, 2017, Andreas Goldthau published a commentary in Nature on the needed global transition to a low-carbon economy.  It does not appear to have attracted much attention, but then the current Trump circus spectacle is monopolizing the media, both fake and social, at least in the western world.  Goldthau may be well known in economic circles, although his is a new name to lowly marine ecologist me, but I believe he knows what he is talking about.  He is director of the Centre of International Public Policy, Royal Holloway, University of London; an associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University; and provides scientific support to the German G20 presidency.  (With those responsibilities, I’m surprised he had time to write an article for Nature!)

In his Nature piece (which is open access), Goldthau argues that the G20 is an appropriate global grouping to govern the global shift to a low-carbon economy.  Whether or not the G20 is capable of doing this, the need for global governance should be readily apparent when we consider the extent of the change that is required if we are to accomplish a smooth transition in the short time necessary to keep the warming of the world’s climate within a 2oC limit set by the Paris Agreement.  Since many environmental scientists are now arguing that even 1.5oC is too large an increase to retain reasonable ecological sustainability, the need to keep within the 2oC limit should now be seen as beyond dispute if we want a reasonably sane future.  (Coral reefs are an ecosystem that is being radically and irrevocably changed by the 0.9oC increase already seen.)  Goldthau’s article provides a concise listing of the changes that have to occur, the costs of same, and the degree of economic and societal disruption that is likely.  The need for global governance to make this transition as smooth as possible is a no-brainer.  Goldthau’s article is worth a read, because few people yet understand the extent of the transition that faces us.

Some countries, such as most of those in (A) gain most of their GDP from exploitation of their fossil fuel resources, and could be hit hard as we transition.  Other countries (B), with the capacity to develop low-carbon technologies, should be winners.  This mismatch demands global governance of the transition to minimize and spread risks if economic disruption is to be minimized.  Figure © A. Goldthau and Nature.

The issue that makes this transition particularly complex, is that there will be losers as well as winners among countries.  For example, the global price tag for the energy transition could be US$ 120 trillion between now and 2050, because we must halve oil use and cease use of coal during that time to have even a 66% chance of remaining within the 2oC limit.  That is about twice the current annual investment in energy projects, every year until 2050.  During this transition, there could be big winners and big losers, partly because fossil fuels yield most of their dollar value as they are extracted, while renewables yield value through innovations in advanced technology.  Technologically strong nations, particularly among the OECD nations and China, will have most to gain, while technologically weak, but fossil fuel rich countries will lose.  Countries like Russia, Saudi Arabia and Australia, rich in fossil fuels, may be unable to sell their fuels, and the falling tax revenues in such countries, and failing corporations with major fossil fuel investments, could combine to stress and perhaps collapse economies.  Goldthau argues that global governance is essential to prevent the risks involved spiraling out of control.

The current global value of all recoverable fossil fuel reserves is about $100 trillion, five times the GDP of the USA.  Those assets are held by pension funds, banks, companies, municipalities and private households around the world, but keeping within the 2oC limit requires that we burn no more than one third of them.  Most of those assets are going to have to disappear into thin air when coal, oil, or gas gets left in the ground.  In addition to these losses, there are capital costs of old energy infrastructure, from wells to refineries, to pipelines to power plants that will never be recouped.  The losses won’t be limited to investors, but will ramify through the world economy – fossil fuels represent 20-30% of the value of stocks across world markets.

There are economic benefits in the renewable energy sector as well.  Indeed, Goldthau repeats IRENA’s estimate that doubling the proportion of renewables in the global energy mix by 2030 would increase the global rate of economic growth by 1 percent.  But the benefits are unlikely to accrue to those sectors losing out as fossil fuels collapse.  We will need some degree of global coordination to minimize and spread the risk associated with these changes.  Given the current (political) state of the world I have little confidence that putting such governance in place will be easy.  So, in the final analysis, this need for global governance is just one more way in which the task in front of us is massively wicked.  (Wicked problems are large, complex, and hideously difficult to solve… and we caused this problem ourselves!)

What about Canada?

Goldthau barely mentioned Canada in his article, although his chart does show Canada as receiving only a small percentage of net GDP in the form of oil rents – a sign of how unprofitable the Canadian oil sector is at present, rather than a measure of the importance of the fossil fuel sector to our economy.  And Canada’s transition out of fossil fuels seems increasingly likely to be driven more by market forces than by concerted action on climate.  This is because our chief oil reserves are locked up in tar sands, difficult and costly to extract, and difficult to refine into desired products, and because our main oil and gas reserves are in places that are far from existing markets, and separated by highly valued natural environments from getting better access.  Canadian past foolishness in not providing for refining capacity, or in carefully thinking through routes to market is now making our products a lot less desirable than competing products from elsewhere.  In an economy in which demand for fossil fuels is no longer guaranteed to grow and may well shrink rapidly, Canadian products are at a distinct disadvantage.

Supporting evidence of the current state of Canada’s fossil fuel sector is readily available in the media.  To begin with, the price of oil remains stubbornly under $50 per barrel despite OPEC efforts to reduce supply.  On August 24th, the Globe & Mail reported that bond-rating service DBRS is forecasting continued sluggishness through 2019, with crude prices that year in the $50-55 per barrel range.  This is at least $10 lower than the number being used by Canada’s oil-producing provinces in their own financial forward planning, suggesting that significant shortfalls are in the offing.  Alberta, with a $10 billion deficit this year, is likely to face particularly difficult times.

Low prices also affect investment in the Canadian industry.  Back in June, Adam Waterous discussed the changing pattern of investment in Canadian oil reserves.  He noted that foreign corporations had divested themselves of $24 billion in Canadian oil assets over the previous three months, selling to Canadian partners.  He suggested this is part of a global trend for companies to invest in resources closer to home, to specialize in extraction from the stores they know best, and in the regulatory regime they understand best.  He argued, as an oilman, that this means we are going to enjoy the benefits of Canadian ownership of our oil patch.  I find that an interesting spin that conveniently forgets the difficulty of selling tar sands product on a global market for prices that will allow even a modest profit on investments.  I think it much more likely that Canadian oil corporations are being set up to be left holding the bag when the value evaporates, as it must if we are to keep most oil reserves in the ground.  My conclusion – we definitely don’t need lots of new pipelines, because we are not going to be selling much oil overseas in future.  We will use some of our oil to fill domestic need, and will have to write off the value of most of it.

Which brings me to another cost looming for places like Alberta – the cost of environmental remediation after the oil boom fades.  This is a cost with a perverse negative effect on decisions to invest in these resources, as well as one that looms over current owners and citizens.  On July 14th, Tim Gray of Environmental Defense, writing in the Globe & Mail, raised this issue.  His article was prompted by a recent court case in which costs of clean-up had not been deemed important enough to be paid ahead of debts to creditors of a bankrupt oil company.  That case is being appealed by the Alberta Energy Regulator, which wisely recognizes the immense, and growing, unfunded costs of environmental remediation on the books of oil companies throughout that province.  In the tar sands, in particular, there are now tailings ponds (lakes really) that in total cover an area greater than that of Vancouver plus downtown Toronto combined, and growing at 25 million litres per day.  These lakes are filled with toxic hydrocarbons, heavy metals, water and sand, and oil companies have yet to propose any way to remediate them, other than hoping for the best (the naïve idea that they will somehow settle out, allowing a vibrant living lake to exist on top of the toxic mess below).  Canada and its provinces have been lax in not requiring oil companies to set aside funds to cover remediation costs.  With lots of nodding and winking, all parties have pretended that promises to leave the environment clean and functioning after the oil is extracted would be good enough.  When value evaporates, as it will, and companies collapse, or move off to greener pastures, such promises will be long forgotten, and funding will simply not appear.  The mess will remain, as a long-term cost to the people (and environments) of Alberta, and perversely an additional reason why Canadian tar sands oil will not fare well on world markets.

Lest you think I am just an environmental scientist wading into waters he does not understand, a recent article in Hill Times makes essentially the same point I am making about the role of the fossil fuel industry in Canada’s economy – it is going to get a lot smaller.  That article points also to patterns in the gas industry showing similar things to oil – claims that are bolstered by several recent news items on developments in BC.  In Canada, large, export-driven natural gas projects are fizzling as their development costs prove uncompetitive.  Canada is not becoming a global petrostate, after all, which is actually a good thing if we are going to do our fair share to rein in climate change.

Reverting to a global perspective, it is quite difficult to discern what is happening with the demand for oil.  While current data indicate that the demand for oil continues to rise, though at a slowing rate, different sources claim their own crystal balls tell quite different stories about the next few decades.  A big part of the problem lies in uncertainty about the rate at which electric cars, self-driving cars, and an Uber economy in which private vehicles become increasingly a nostalgic luxury, are going to alter the demand for oil for transportation.  In an article in late May, the Wall Street Journal provided a list of predictions:

Shell, headquartered in Europe, has the most pessimistic view and is actively shifting out of oil and into gas.  The IEA, also in Europe, sees the peak in demand not coming until sometime after 2040, although they report that 2018 will see a lower increase in demand compared to 2017.  Other oil companies are all over the place (and you can bet that what an oil company says publicly is likely more optimistic about continuing demand than what it whispers in closed-door meetings).  Chevron and Exxon-Mobil, both based in the climate-denying USA – don’t even see a peak on the horizon!  Still, regardless of what oil companies proclaim, our need to fight climate change will likely bring down our use of oil more rapidly than most prognosticators claim to expect.  ThinkProgress heads its article on the coming decline in use of oil an investor death spiral driven by the rise of electric cars.

So how is the environment faring anyway?

The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere above Mauna Kea stood at 404.82 ppm on August 27th, declining slowly from its seasonal peak this May (when it approached 410 ppm).  July tied July 2016 as the warmest July on record, despite relatively cooler, wetter weather in the eastern portion of North America.

Yes, I’ve seen this map before.  In fact, all the maps for the past 7 years have looked remarkably similar – the planet is becoming pink.  But the message is serious; this July was just 0.05oC cooler than July 2016, the warmest July on record.  And this month was also the 391st consecutive month that was warmer than the 20th century average for that month.  I’d bet on maps continuing to look like this into the future!  Image courtesy NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information.

The draft Climate Science Special Report, being finalized by the US government, and brought to public attention by the New York Times, is quite clear.  “The world has warmed (globally and annually averaged surface air temperature) by about 1.6°F (0.9°C) over the last 150 years (1865–2015), and the spatial and temporal non-uniformity of the warming has triggered many other changes to the Earth’s climate.”  “Many lines of evidence demonstrate that human activities, especially emissions of greenhouse (heat-trapping) gases, are primarily responsible for recent observed climate changes.”  And it goes on to report all the things you and I know already about likely increases in temperature, changes in patterns of precipitation, and greater frequency of severe weather events during coming decades.  I cannot wait to learn what chief clowns Scott and Donald will do with it, but it likely won’t make their climate change-denying souls happy.

What new science is telling us

There has been other climate news if one ventures into the science literature.  On 24th July Nature Climate Change posted a new article by Guojian Wang, of the Ocean University of China, and a team of seven colleagues from Chinese, Australian and US laboratories (available here).  It reported analyses of global climate model performance with respect to el Niño events.  By studying responses of 13 global climate models under the aggressive RCP2.6 scenario – the only modeled IPCC scenario for CO2 mitigation that achieves a warming target of <+1.5oC during this century — they reveal that the frequency of extreme el Niño events (comparable to that in 1997-98, or in 2014-16) increases linearly with global mean temperature and has doubled by the time temperature reaches +1.5oC.  Furthermore, they find that even though modeled global temperature stabilized at +1.5oC around 2050, the frequency of extreme el Niños continued through this century.  Where el Niños of 1997-98 size occurred about once every 22 years under preindustrial conditions, the models generated them about once every 10 years around mid-century, and about once every 7 years by century end.   Comparable effects on severity of la Niña were not seen.

This is a modeling study, and while the models are very good, models can deceive.  Still, given the extent to which extreme el Niños now impact weather patterns around the world, these results should give us pause.  They suggest that even if we can stabilize warming, keeping it within 1.5oC – a very demanding task itself – we are still going to have to deal with an increased frequency of severe el Niños and the damage they cause.  We really opened Pandora’s box when we began to warm the climate.

Another piece of bad climate news was provided by an article in Science Advances, which appeared on 2nd August (it’s open access).  In it, Im Eun-Soon of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, with two colleagues from US institutions, reported on the likelihood of life-threatening heat waves as climate warms.  They used a wet-bulb temperature of 35oC, recognized as a lethal threshold for humans, and examined occurrences of heat this extreme under a business-as-usual (RCP8.5) and under a moderate emissions reduction (RCP4.5) scenario of fossil fuel use.  (The wet-bulb temperature is defined as the temperature that an air parcel would attain if cooled at constant pressure by evaporating water within it until saturation.  It is a combined measure of temperature and humidity, and is always equal to or less than the usual (dry-bulb) temperature as reported in weather forecasts.)  Eun-Soon and colleagues note that previous studies have already pointed to problems of extreme heat in the Persian Gulf region, so they turned their attention to south Asia.

Figure 2 (part) from the Eun-Soon article showing annual maximum levels of wet-bulb temperature for present-day (left), and expected at end-century (2071-2100) under moderate emissions mitigation (center) and business-as-usual scenarios (right panel).
Figure
© Eun-Soon and Science Advances.

Eun-Soon and colleagues show that towards the end of this century, under the more extreme, business-as-usual conditions, the 35oC wet-bulb threshold is exceeded at a few locations in the Chota Nagpur Plateau, northeastern India, and Bangladesh, and that this threshold is approached over most of South Asia, including the Ganges river valley, northeastern India, Bangladesh, the eastern coast of India, Chota Nagpur Plateau, northern Sri Lanka, and the Indus valley of Pakistan. many regions in south Asia, and some in south-east Asia, exceed this limit.  We don’t need to be reminded of the enormous numbers of people who live in these places, or of the fact that they have modeled average climates rather than results for particularly warm years.  As they state in the final sentence of their abstract, “climate change, without mitigation, presents a serious and unique risk in South Asia, a region inhabited by about one-fifth of the global human population, due to an unprecedented combination of severe natural hazard and acute vulnerability”.  What do we do with this information?  Some of us in the west, may simply breathe a sigh of relief that we live where we do.  Others might be motivated to work even harder to bring climate change under control.

There has also been some good climate news in the technical press.  On 24th August, Nature published a report by Vasilii Petrenko of the University of Rochester, and a team of 15 colleagues from institutions in Australia, the US, and Europe.  It concerned methane emissions in the past, specifically during the time known as the Younger Dryas-Preboreal warming period, 11,700 to 11,300 years ago.  That was a time long before humans were having significant effects on climate, when the planet underwent a rapid warming over a matter of decades at the start of the Holocene.  Petrenko and colleagues sampled methane trapped in bubbles of ancient air in ice from the Taylor Glacier in Antarctica, and separated methane comprised of 14C from methane comprised of 12C.  Methane from ancient fossil sources contains essentially no 14C because it will have all decayed, while methane from recently living sources contains a ratio of 14C to 12C that approximates that in the atmosphere (as much more abundant CO2) at the time the methane was formed.  At the present time, the world is experiencing a combination of methane emissions from fossil sources that includes natural emissions and man-made emissions due to our fossil fuel and other mining activities, but in the Younger Dryas all fossil methane emissions were natural.

The changing concentration of methane in the atmosphere is shown as parts per billion by volume for the period from the late Pleistocene through the Holocene.  YD and PB refer to the Younger Dryas and Preboreal periods when the second of two very rapid increases in concentration occurred, and the time frame within which Petrenko and colleagues did their analyses.  Not shown is the recent very rapid rise in methane concentration to more than 1800 ppbv due primarily to human-caused emissions during the last 100 years.
Image
© P. Hopcroft and Nature.

So, what on earth does all this have to do with climate change?  Methane is ‘the other’ greenhouse gas that we are emitting into the atmosphere, and while we can get estimates of the rate of total emissions (human-caused plus natural) by measuring the concentration of methane in the atmosphere, and using our knowledge of the processes and pathways that remove it from the atmosphere, those estimates of emission rate are relatively imprecise.  By looking at what happened during the Younger Dryas-Preboreal time, it is possible to gain a more accurate estimate of the rate of natural emissions of fossil methane at a time when the world was warming, under conditions not too very far removed from today.  And that is what Petrenko and colleagues have done.

To appreciate what their approach required, understand that they are measuring trace amounts of methane in minute bubbles of air (at ratios of the order of 10-19 parts methane per part of air), while discriminating methane composed using 14C from that using 12C.  This is micro-scale measurement that makes the eyes of this environmental scientist blur – not something I’d want to do, but something that causes me to be impressed by the capabilities of those who dig doing this type of science.  To make their measurements, Petrenko and colleagues had to use rather large samples of subsurface, dated ice from the glacier – about 1000 kg per sample.

What did they find?  That the rapid increase in atmospheric methane during that time period was due almost entirely to emissions of methane from wetlands and other sources of recently-formed methane, and that no more than 19% of the methane emissions originated from fossil sources such as marine methane hydrates and melting permafrost.  Their best estimates are that natural emissions of fossil (14C-free) methane at that time were 15.4 teragrams CH4 per year or less (that’s 15.4 billion kilograms of methane).

What does this have to do with present-day climate change?  A lot, because our current estimates of the contribution of fossil methane to total emissions are around 52 teragrams CH4 per year.  If we assume, as Petrenko and colleagues do, that present-day rates of emissions of fossil methane from natural sources are no greater than they were during Younger Dryas-Preboreal times, our current estimates of that rate are too high by at least 36 teragrams CH4 per year.  Conversely, and this is the important point, our estimates of human-caused emissions of fossil methane are too low by that same amount.  Climate scientists have long recognized that preventing the so-called fugitive emissions of methane that leak from oil and gas wells, that are often deliberately flared (burned) rather than being captured, would reduce overall methane emissions, thereby curtailing climate change and capturing additional hydrocarbon supplies from our mining activities.  What seems evident, based on Petrenko and colleagues’ work, is that we have greater scope for such fugitive capture than we had anticipated.  (What galls me is that I bet the oil and gas companies have known this all along, even if they did not know just how much more fugitive methane was available for capture.)

Another encouraging outcome, is that these results confirm that the rate of emissions of fossil methane did not grow during the rapid warming period (although emissions of methane from sources like wetlands clearly did).  While the Younger Dryas, a bit colder than now and only recently following a major glaciation, is not an exact analog of today, we can perhaps relax our concern over what will happen as climate warms and the Arctic melts.  Sure, there will be some positive feedback as frozen methane stores are released, but the extent of that positive feedback, seems, just perhaps, less frightening than it had.  And in this crazy world, a slight diminution of frightening news is definitely good news!

On to the more political news

My final article from the technical press is a fun one indeed.  Naomi Oreskes, a science historian at Harvard, has done a great job exposing the systematic pattern of lying and misinformation practiced by the climate deniers, and the degree to which they cooperate with each other to systematically cast doubt on the evidence for climate change.  This group, well-represented in the USA, but with outlier cells in other countries such as Canada, Australia and the UK, has applied the lessons learned from the successful, multi-year campaign by the cigarette manufacturers to muddle the evidence on the link to cancer, thereby gaining many years of profitable sales by denying the inevitable.  (Indeed, many of the active participants in climate change denial had previous lives in the ‘smoking is not dangerous’ campaign.)  Anyway, Oreskes decided to take up a challenge thrown down by Exxon-Mobil.

As part of a probe begun in 2015 by various parties including the New York Attorney General into Exxon-Mobil’s possible criminal behavior in deliberately misreporting the climate science being done by its own scientists, the giant company found itself beset by numerous subpoenas and similar legal entanglements.  In its defense, Exxon-Mobil posted an extraordinary statement on its website, in which it claimed categorically that it had never distorted or withheld the results of climate research by its science team over its 40-year long history as a company.  On the site, on 20 October, 2015, Exxon-Mobil posted copies of the 50 peer-reviewed documents its climate scientists had generated over that time, as well as a number of other public documents it had produced over the same period.  On the site, Exxon-Mobil stated: “Read the documents.  Go ahead, you really should. Read the documents InsideClimate News cites that purportedly prove some conspiracy on ExxonMobil’s part to hide our climate science findings.  In case you need help finding them, the link to the documents in question is right here.”

This was a challenge Naomi Oreskes could not refuse!  The article, in Environmental Research Letters, authored by Geoffrey Supran, her post-doctoral fellow, and Naomi Oreskes, appeared on 23rd August.  It’s open access, here, and the New York Times wrote an interesting report on it.  Supran and Oreskes compared 187 climate change communications from ExxonMobil, including peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed publications, internal company documents, and paid, editorial-style advertisements (‘advertorials’) in The New York Times.  These included all documents offered by Exxon-Mobil with its challenge, and all other publicly accessible documents they could obtain.  They specifically excluded “archived internal documents, advertorials published in newspapers beyond the NYT, and non-peer-reviewed materials such as speech transcripts, television adverts, patent documents, shareholder reports, and third-party communications (for example, from lobbyists, think-tanks, and politicians funded by ExxonMobil)”, but acknowledged that such documents could form the basis of a more extensive analysis.  They looked specifically for positions taken in the various documents on the reality of climate change, on whether it is human-caused, on its seriousness, and on the degree to which there are solutions to it.

What they found was a systematic increase in doubt as one moved from the relatively hidden (from the general public) internal and peer-reviewed documents through the other public documents to the advertorials, which raised the greatest amount of doubt.  This was true whether one considered the question of whether climate change was real and human-caused, whether it was serious, or whether feasible solutions to this problem existed.

The shifting perspective on climate change available in Exxon-Mobil documents, as assessed by Supran and Oreskes.  In each case, more readily accessible documents are more likely to cast doubt on the existence, cause, importance or solvability of climate change.
Figure
© N. Oreskes and Environmental Research Letters.

In their conclusions, Supran and Oreskes are careful to note that they are NOT concluding that Exxon-Mobil suppressed, withheld, or sought to hide data on climate science.  They note explicitly that Exxon-Mobil contributed to climate science.  However, they argue their analysis supports the conclusion that Exxon-Mobil misled non-scientific audiences on climate change.  They support this claim with three points: 1) the claims about climate change vary substantially among the categories of article, with the advertorials being far and away the most skeptical; 2) in public, Exxon-Mobil contributed quietly to climate science and loudly to raising doubts about it; 3) the advertorials contained several instances of explicit factual misrepresentations concerning climate science.  Supran and Oreskes reached their conclusion about quiet contribution and loud casting of doubt in the following way.  They report that Exxon-Mobil purchased space for an advertorial in the New York Times every week from 1972 to 2001, that these cost, on average $31000 each, and that one quarter of them fell on the Op-Ed page.  This is a hefty expenditure to secure a very public pulpit for the doubt-creating advertorials.  While Exxon-Mobil peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed articles are poorly cited (suggesting readership in the 10s to 100s), and peer-reviewed articles are usually locked behind paywalls, inaccessible except to scientists and others with access to an academic library, the advertorials were seen by millions of readers.  My summation: Supran and Oreskes did precisely what Exxon-Mobil asked – they looked at the evidence and found Exxon-Mobil guilty as charged.  Climate change denial is alive and well at one of the largest fossil fuel corporations on the planet.

I’ll close with brief comments about three other political event-chains relevant to climate change.  In Canada, the Liberal government of British Columbia fell unexpectedly in an election called by a Premier who expected to strengthen her hand, and the New Democratic Party came to power.  The NDP campaigned on opposition to several resource development projects in the province, in particular the expansion of pipeline capacity from Alberta (Kinder Morgan twinning project), and the development of major LNG export projects.  Petronas has already withdrawn from the large LNG project it was leading, and the Kinder-Morgan twinning looks quite shaky now that the provincial government will join the indigenous and environmental groups opposing it.  This poses an interesting dilemma for Justin Trudeau, whose national government has endorsed both projects.  My guess is that Justin is hoping that market forces will make such projects financially non-viable.  That way, he won’t have to make a difficult decision in which he cannot please his followers who want climate action and his followers who want to ensure the resource sector and the national economy flourishes.  Time will tell, but this cartoon from some months ago captures our Prime Minister’s predicament well.

 Cartoon © David Parkins, Globe & Mail.

In Australia, the federal government seems to be entangling itself in something rather sticky and a bit smelly as it tries to encourage development of major new coal export programs, while also claiming it is protecting the Great Barrier Reef, which will inevitably suffer directly as tankers laden with coal sail through its waters, and indirectly when that coal is burned further warming a climate which is already proving too warm for the corals the reef depends upon.  Australia’s latest report on greenhouse gas emissions reveals a particularly poor result (continuing increase in rate of emissions) for a wealthy, developed country that has signed on (half-heartedly) to Paris.  Since the Liberal Country coalition government wrested power from Labor in 2013, greenhouse gas emissions have risen 6% compared to a 10% drop during the 6-year Labor reign.  Emissions are currently 550.4 million tonnes CO2 equivalent per year, pretty high for a country of 24.6 million people, and on par on a per capita basis with emissions in the USA and Canada.

Executive Orders are playing in the center ring while Pruitt and Zinke quietly undo regulations offstage.  Cartoon © J Darcy

And in the USA, the only country on earth where a three-ring circus serves as its government, we have an ongoing performance at center stage by an artful illusionist, the great Donald Trump, who keeps the crowd mesmerized and distracted by a never-ending series of explosive, outrageous, distressing, and even sometimes plain disgusting antics, while his minions quietly dismantle important parts of the country’s governance.  With Donald’s own series of Executive Orders (most of which are admittedly just photo ops using meaningless pieces of paper) creating a drum beat of deregulatory action, henchmen Scott Pruitt at EPA and Ryan Zinke at Interior are quietly dismantling decades of environmental protections affecting land, water, and air across the USA.  Even Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross got into the act by stepping in to reject a decision on flounder catch made by the Atlantic States Fishery Commission, the 75-year old, well-respected fisheries management body for most of the US East Coast.  National Monuments are having their borders redrawn to free up land for mineral exploration, water quality rules are being thrown out like so much bathwater, and regulations governing the releases of greenhouse gases by the energy industry or the automotive industry are all being looked at and rejected when possible.  Along the way, virtually every science-based advisory panel has been re-staffed with industry cronies, or simply disbanded, science information is disappearing from agency websites, and scientists are being reassigned.  It is all very reminiscent of how Harper’s government tried to shut down Canada’s government science, but it is being done far more rapidly, and more thoroughly.  Even some of their fans in the oil and gas industries are becoming worried that they are moving too fast and too far.

The latest move, rolling back the Federal Flood Risk Management Standard, which will remove a requirement to consider climate change and sea level rise when building infrastructure, seems particularly ironic in the week that Hurricane Harvey submerges most of coastal Texas in a meter or so of rain over three days.  As The Guardian said in an article on effects of sea level rise on flood risk two days ago, “Houston already has some of the laxest building regulations for structures in potential flood zones and the president wants to spread that policy across the US”.

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